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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR POLICE
MISCONDUCT: RYMER v. DAVIS
Courts are showing an increased willingness to find municipalities
liable for police misconduct that violates citizens' constitutional rights.
Under the section 1983 civil rights statute,1 municipalities are liable
when improperly trained, supervised, or disciplined police officers vio-
late an individual's civil rights.2 Courts have not responded uniformly
to the problem of municipal liability. Some courts require a pattern of
police misconduct before holding a municipality liable, while other
courts are willing to extend liability for reckless or grossly negligent
training of police officers.3 Municipalities particularly fear exposure to
liability for police officer training and supervision. In Rymer v. Davis
4
the Sixth Circuit strongly discouraged municipalities from bestowing
carte blanche authority to its police officers5 and held a municipality
liable for its complete failure to teach the police force constitutional
1. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit
in equity or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981).
2. The Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), held a municipality liable for civil rights violations under § 1983.
Since Monell the federal courts have resolved the issue of municipal liability and its
limitations in a variety of ways. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. See
generally Zoufal, Municipal Liability and 42 U.S. C. § 1982, 73 ILL. B.J. 98 (1984) (gen-
eral discussion of remedies available under § 1983).
3. See Penland & Boardman, Section 1983-Contemporary Trends in the Police Mis-
conduct Arena, 20 IDAHo L. REV. 661 (1984) (analysis of various judicial approaches to
post-Monell interpretations of municipal liability). For a recent Supreme Court deci-
sion on municipal liability involving police misconduct, see City of Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
4. 754 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3517 (1985).
5. Id. at 201.
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procedures. 6
Paul Rymer, a truck driver, was arrested when law enforcement offi-
cials stopped his convoy.7 During his arrest, a police officer beat and
kicked Rymer violently, hitting him in the stomach and head with a
nightstick.8 The police officer rejected an emergency medical techni-
cian's recommendation that Rymer receive X-ray treatment at a hospi-
tal. Instead, the officer jailed Rymer for the night.9 Rymer later filed a
complaint in district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,10 claiming
deprivation of his civil rights as a result of the mistreatment and inju-
ries sustained during his arrest. The court upheld Rymer's claim11 and
awarded compensatory and punitive damages. 2 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the city's complete failure to
train police officers inferred the presence of a municipal custom that
authorized or condoned police misconduct. 
3
Congress enacted section 198314 to provide a remedy to persons de-
6. Id. at 199.
7. Id. at 200.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 199.
10. See supra note 1.
11. 754 F.2d at 200. The evidence at the trial showed that at the time of Rymer's
arrest, the City of Shephardsville failed to provide either pre-employment training for
its officers or rules and regulations on officer conduct. Id. The city required each officer
to complete forty hours of training each year, but the officer in Rymer never received
instructions on arrest procedures or on treatment of injured persons. Id. The city al-
lowed its police officers to use their own judgment concerning the arrest and treatment
of suspected criminals. Id.
The court instructed the jury that it should find for Rymer if it found by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the city trained its police officers in a way that was so reckless
or grossly negligent that future police misconduct was almost inevitable or substantially
certain to result. Id.
12. Id. at 199. The jury awarded $32,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in
punitive damages against the police and $25,000 in compensatory damages against the
city. But see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (municipality
may not be held liable for punitive damages under § 1983). See also Zoufal, supra note
2, at 99 (general discussion of remedies available under § 1983).
13. 754 F.2d at 201.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871,
ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). Congress enacted § 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, originally known as An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States and for Other Purposes. For a detailed
analysis of the legislative history of § 1983, see Comment, A Survey of Organizational
and Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3),
46 Mo. L. REV. 371, 372 n.1 (1981).
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prived of any rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. 5 The Supreme Court,
however, refused to recognize municipal liability under section 1983
until 1978, when it decided Monell v. Department of Social Services. 6
In Monell the Court changed its earlier position 17 and subjected munic-
ipalities to liability when official policy or custom violated civil
rights.18 The Court indicated that informal policy or custom1 9 may
also give rise to liability under section 1983.20
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), the
Supreme Court ruled that denial of rights under federal statutory law raises a cause of
action under § 1983.
16. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell city employees brought an action against a
municipality claiming that an official governmental policy violated their civil rights.
The Court held that local governing bodies and local officials sued in their official capac-
ities are "persons" within the language of § 1983 and therefore may be sued for consti-
tutional deprivations effected by governmental policy or custom. Id. at 690-91.
17. In Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), rev'd, 436 U.S. 663 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that individuals did not have direct causes of action against munic-
ipalities for a § 1983 violation. The Court based its decision in both Monroe and Monell
on its interpretation of the debate during the Forty-Second Congress' enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). For a comparison of the interpretations
that the Monroe and Monell Courts gave to the legislative and judicial histories of
§ 1983, see Comment, The Supreme Court Rewrites a Law: Municipal Liability Under
Section 1983, 15 URB. LAW. 503 (1983).
18. 436 U.S. at 694. The Court declared that "when execution of a government's
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury," the municipality as a whole is
liable under § 1983. Id.
19. 436 U.S. at 691. Because Monell involved a situation in which "official policy"
was the cause of the violation, the Court devoted little attention to a definition of cus-
tom or policy. The Court relied on a definition previously used in Adickes v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970), which stated that "Congress included cus-
toms and usages [in § 1983] because of the persistent and widespread discriminatory
practices of state officials... Although not authorized by written law, such practices of
state officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or
usage' with the force of law." 436 U.S. at 691. Even in the recent decision of City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), the Court failed to provide specific gi-
udelines as to "policy or custom." Among the lower federal courts, a wide variety of
interpretations of policy or custom exists. See, e.g., Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932
(4th Cir. 1983) (past history of similar incidents required); Herrera v. Valentine, 653
F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981) (continuing pattern of police misconduct required to satisfy
custom or policy).
20. 436 U.S. at 691. The Court concluded that a municipality is not liable solely
because the municipality employs a tortfeasor. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court rejected three justifications for imposing liability under a respondeat superior the-
ory. Id. at 693. First, the Court rejected the theory that accidents might be reduced if
employers, though blameless, had to bear the cost of accidents. Id. The Court also
1987]
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Two later Supreme Court decisions, Owen v. City of Independence21
and Polk County v. Dodson,22 further defined the scope of municipal
liability. In Owen the Court ruled that while a municipality cannot
claim immunity from damages if held liable under section 1983,23 gov-
ernment employees can claim protection from personal liability under
the good faith immunity doctrine.24 In Polk County the Court reaf-
firmed its ruling in Monell and held that the official policy must be the
cause of the constitutional violation before a municipality can be liable
under section 1983.25 The Court further indicated that no liability will
be imposed unless the disputed official custom or policy is found
unconstitutional.26
The trilogy of Supreme Court cases outlining the contours of munic-
ipal liability-Monell, Owen, and Polk County-failed to give specific
guidelines on the "policy or custom" restriction on municipal liabil-
ity.2 7 In the recent decision of City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,28 the
rejected the proposal that the community at large should bear the accident costs under
an insurance theory. Id. at 693-94. Because both of these justifications were insuffi-
cient to sustain the Sherman amendment to the Civil Rights Act, the Court reasoned
that they were also insufficient to sustain liability on the basis of respondeat superior. Id.
at 694. Finally, the Court rejected the third justification, the argument that liability
follows the right to control a tortfeasor's actions. The Court stated: "By our decision
in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), we would appear to have decided that the mere
right to control without any control or direction having been exercised and without any
failure to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability." 436 U.S. at 694.
21. 445 U.S. 622 (1980), reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1979).
22. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
23. 445 U.S. at 651.
24. The common law doctrine of good faith immunity provides protection from
personal liability to an employee or official who acts in good faith. See generally Pen-
land & Boardman, supra note 3, at 684-92 (analysis of the subjective and objective tests
that the courts use to establish good faith immunity).
25. 454 U.S. at 326 (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658(1978)). The Court emphasized the Monell ruling that a § 1983 claim will not survive if
it rests on a respondeat superior theory of liability. 454 U.S. at 325. A municipality will
be held liable only when its officials act pursuant to official policy or custom. Id. at 326.
The Court stressed the importance of a causal link between the policy or custom and the
deprivation of civil rights. Id.
26. Id. at 326. Claimant alleged that his attorney from the county's public defender
office withdrew from his case, causing a violation of his rights under the sixth, eighth,
and fourteenth amendments. Id. Claimant failed, however, to allege any administrative
policy as the cause of the constitutional rights violation. Id. Unless the policy itself is
unconstitutional, the municipality cannot be held liable for depriving an individual of
civil rights. Id.
27. See supra notes 17-18.
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only other Supreme Court decision dealing with municipal liability for
police officer misconduct, the Court similarly failed to articulate what
constitutes a custom or policy.29 Consistent with the vast majority of
lower federal rulings,3 ° the Court held that a single incident of exces-
sive force by a police officer does not establish an official policy or prac-
tice.31 The Court, however, specifically noted that it failed to address
the issue of whether inadequate training of police officers meets the
Monell custom or policy requirement.3 2
Two problems surface when the lower federal courts apply the gen-
eral principles established by these Supreme Court cases to the police
misconduct context. First, the courts seek to define the limits of the
Monell policy or custom restriction. Second, the courts examine the
causal relationship between the policy or custom and the constitutional
violation.
33
28. 471 U.S. 808 (1985). In Tuttle the Court addressed the question of whether a
single isolated incident of a police officer's use of excessive force establishes a municipal
policy or practice. The Court emphasized that more than a single incident of miscon-
duct is necessary to constitute a municipal custom. Id. at 812. The Court noted:
Where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional [such as inadequate
training], considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in
every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and
the causal connection between the policy and the constitutional definition.
Id.
Tuttle thus overruled Owens v. Haas, 602 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
980 (1979), in which the court held that a single incident of misconduct can meet the
policy or custom requirement. Id. at 1246-47. Owens concluded that a municipality is
liable when the single incident of misconduct is a causal link between the municipality's
deliberate indifference in training its officials and the violation of the citizen's constitu-
tional rights. Id.
29. 471 U.S. at 808. The Court left unanswered the important question of whether
inadequate training could meet the Monell policy or custom requirement. Id.
30. See infra note 43. See also Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th Cir.
1981) (the "mere allegation of a single act of unconstitutional conduct by a municipal
employee will not support the inference that such conduct was pursuant to official poli-
cies"). See also Penland & Boardman, supra note 3, at 679-80 (discussion of cases hold-
ing that a single misconduct is insufficient to establish liability).
31. 471 U.S. at 808.
32. The Court also left unanswered the question of whether a policymaker's "gross
negligence" in establishing police training practices is sufficient to constitute a "policy"
that is the "moving force" behind subsequent unconstitutional conduct or whether the
policymaker must make a more conscious decision before a policy or custom is estab-
lished. Id.
33. Many of these decisions allow § 1983 recovery against a municipality for its
failure to adequately train, control, or discipline police officers, but require evidence of a
pattern of misconduct. See, e.g., Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981)
1987]
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Lower courts interpreting the Monell policy or custom requirement
have found municipal liability in a number of factual situations involv-
ing a municipality's failure to supervise, control, or train its officers.34
In Herrera v. Valentine35 the Eighth Circuit held that a municipality's
continuous failure to remedy the known unconstitutional conduct of its
police officers satisfied the policy or custom requirement.3 6 The Her-
rera court explained that such a continuing failure to remedy consti-
tutes the type of informal policy or custom that is grounds for a cause
of action under section 1983. 3' The court found a pattern of miscon-
(continuing pattern of police misconduct resulted in municipal liability for injuries sus-
tained by victims of misconduct). See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. Other
decisions indicate that a pattern of misconduct is not necessary. Rather, recovery may
be available for injury resulting from a complete failure to train or grossly inadequate
training of the city's police force. See, e.g., Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982) (municipal liability when either a complete
failure to train or reckless or grossly negligent training of the police force exists). See
infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
One author suggests that the absence of rigid internal policies prohibiting police mis-
conduct,should constitute a prima facie case of municipal liability. See Schnapper, Civil
Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979).
34. For situations other than the police misconduct context in which official inac-
tion is the basis of § 1983 liability, see Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980) (failure to provide sufficient living conditions for prison
inmates); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983) (failure to supervise in foster care home); Thompson v.
New York, 487 F. Supp. 212 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (failure to provide police and fire protec-
tion for Indian reservations).
Other recent decisions have based liability on a failure to make policy when affirma-
tive guidelines are necessary. See Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111 (4th Cir.
1981) (failure to provide sufficient guidelines for sterilization counseling by public agen-
cies). See also Note, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: The Failure to Act as "Custom
or Policy," 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1225, 1234 (1983) (author discusses how a "policy of no
policy" in situations requiring affirmative guidelines may encourage employee miscon-
duct involving no less than a failure to supervise).
35. 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
36. Id. at 1225.
37. Id. at 1224. The plaintiff had previously complained to the City about the po-
lice department's use of excessive force, sexual misconduct, racist conduct, and selective
enforcement of the laws. Id. at 1225. After the City failed to remedy these complaints,
the Nebraska Indian Commission twice convened a hearing on the police misconduct.
Id. The Commission received over forty complaints of police misconduct. Id. In addi-
tion, the City Council and the Mayor heard the complaints of police misconduct but
failed to remedy the problem or report back to the plaintiff. Id.
The court relied on the Monell ruling that a well-settled practice of government offi-
cials may be a "custom" even though this custom is unwritten law. Id. at 1224. Thus,
the court had a basis to conclude that the municipality's failure to correct the miscon-
duct of its police officers was a well-settled practice or an informal custom. Id.
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duct in the city's failure to respond to notifications that the police force
needed closer supervision.38 According to the court in Herrera, this
pattern of failing to properly train, supervise, and control the city's
police officers directly caused injuries to the arrestee, thus establishing
a causal link between the policy or custom and the constitutional
violation.39
The Fourth Circuit expanded upon the Herrera court's use of the
Monell policy or custom requirement in Wellington v. Daniel.g The
court in Wellington required a history of widespread abuse41 in the
supervision and training of police officers before holding a municipality
liable under section 1983.42 The court emphasized that a municipality
is liable only for omissions that manifest government policy or custom
38. Id. at 1225.
39. Id. The court relied on Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655 n.39,
reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1979) (discussed supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text)
to establish municipal liability. The court found that the city's failure to train, disci-
pline, and control the police officers breached a duty to the plaintiff, thereby resulting in
a deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 653 F.2d at 1224. Id. See Butler,
Liability of Municipalities for Police Brutality, TENN. B.J., May 1983, at 21 (general
history of Supreme Court's decisions on municipal liability).
40. 717 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 936. The facts of Wellington support the strict standard applied in the
court's interpretation of an official policy or custom. The plaintiff suffered severe inju-
ries during an arrest by an officer who used a special type of flashlight to physically
subdue the plaintiff. Id. at 934. Evidence existed that the chief of police was aware that
the use of these flashlights in other jurisdictions had caused serious and even fatal inju-
ries. Id. at 935. The police chief was also aware that his subordinate officers sometimes
used the flashlights as a weapon. Id. The court's focus, however, was on the police
chief's lack of awareness regarding actual problems in his force's previous use of the
flashlight. Id. The court stated that the police chief's acts and omissions reflected gov-
ernment policy and municipal liability may attach to acts or omissions performed pur-
suant to that policy. Id. at 936. Even though the police chief was aware of the harmful
consequences of his inaction, he did not have knowledge of a history of actual problems
from his officer's misuse of their flashlights. Id. at 937. Thus, the court held no official
policy or custom of failure to properly train or supervise existed. Id. As a result, the
court had no basis to impose liability on the municipality. Id.
42. See Penland & Boardman, supra note 3, at 683. The authors suggest that the
Wellington court's strict definition of a policy overly accommodates municipalities.
"[The court's] indication that the police chief could only be liable if similar incidents
had occurred in his precinct, even though he was aware of the serious consequences of
his inaction, seems to put the proverbial cart before the horse." Id. The authors also
discuss the unfair policy implications of Wellington in comparison to the more realistic
approach of Herrera. Id. According to the authors, the Wellington requirement of
specific past incidents of misconduct in the police jurisdiction, which disregards the
police chief's knowledge of the harmful effect of the action or inaction in dispute, breeds
an "ostrich" approach to policy supervision. Id.
1987]
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and not for single acts of misconduct.43
The court in Hays v. Jefferson County44 took a different approach.
Rather than focus on the limitations of the policy or custom require-
ment as in Herrera and Wellington, the Hays court concentrated on the
liability aspect and established municipal liability when there is either a
complete failure to train the police force or recklessness or gross negli-
gence in training.45 The court concluded that under either condition
future police misconduct is inevitable.46 In Hays the Sixth Circuit
ruled that the causal relationship between the failure to train the officer
and the officer's misconduct is equivalent to the Monell requirement of
an existing custom or policy of police misconduct.47 The Hays major-
ity, however, failed to indicate whether a municipality's encourage-
ment of or direct participation in the unconstitutional conduct of its
officers would permit an interference of a custom or policy of police
misconduct.48
The dissenting justice in Hays questioned whether the lack of a pol-
icy or custom fairly indicated the municipality's approval of police mis-
43. 717 F.2d at 936. See, e.g., Gillmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1985) (no municipal liability for an isolated incident
in which the police officers used excessive force); Baker v. McCoy, 739 F.2d 381 (8th
Cir. 1984) (single beating by police officer is not a custom); Berry v. McLemore, 670
F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 790 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1986) (single improper arrest is
not a custom); McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979) (isolated incident
of misbehavior does not constitute a custom or policy).
44. 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1983).
45. 668 F.2d at 874. The same court that decided Hays, however, later noted in
Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151, 153-54 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 467 U.S. 1204(1984), that the Supreme Court had undermined the Hays decision in Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527 (1981). Consistent with the Court's views in Parratt, the court in Bran-
don held that simple negligence, in addition to the higher standards of gross negligence
or recklessness, is sufficient to support § 1983 liability. Cf. Hirst v. Girsten, 676 F.2d
1252, 1263 (9th Cir. 1982) (court ruled that the reasoning in Parratt controls cases in
which § 1983 liability is sought for simple negligence). Compare Rhiner v. City of
Clive, 373 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 1985) (municipality cannot be held liable for simple negli-
gence in training or supervising its police officers).
46. 668 F.2d at 874.
47. Id. at 872. The Hays court relied on Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), in
which the Supreme Court held that a direct causal link must exist between the acts of
the supervisory officials and the individual officers. Id. at 371. Because the supervisory
official is responsible for implementing municipal policies and procedures, municipal
liability attaches to acts or omissions performed pursuant to that policy. Id. at 370-71.
48. 668 F.2d at 872. In the dissent, however, Judge Merritt argued no evidence
existed that an injury resulted from a municipal policy or custom "tacitly or expressly
adopted or followed by the county or its officials." Id. at 876.
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conduct.4 9 The dissent argued that the plaintiff must prove that the
municipality followed a custom or policy of encouraging or condoning
police brutality before he may recover under section 1983.50 In addi-
tion, the dissent failed to find any evidence that the plaintiff's injury
resulted from municipal policy or custom.5
In Rymer v. Davis 2 the Sixth Circuit attempted to clarify the con-
cerns raised in the Hays dissent. 53 The court focused on three criteria
for determining municipal liability: the policy or custom requirement,
the basis of liability, and the causal link between the failure to train and
the police officer misconduct.54 First, the Rymer court addressed the
Monell policy or custom requirement.55 The court stated that a mu-
nicipality's failure to train or gross negligence in training its police
force implies a municipal custom that authorizes or condones police
misconduct.56 The Rymer court thus ruled on the exact issue that the
Supreme Court had refused to address in Tuttle." The court did not
infer policy or custom from a single incident of police misconduct.58
Rather, the court found that the overall inadequate training of the mu-
nicipality's police officers met the policy or custom requirement of
49. Id. at 876 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. The dissent pointed out that to establish a policy or custom, the plaintiff
must show that "the city had notice of a prior pattern of police misconduct likely to
recur if no steps were taken to prevent it." Id. This requirement of a pattern of miscon-
duct is the approach of Herrera. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
52. 754 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of Shephardsville
v. Rymer, 105 S. Ct. 3518, reaff'd sub nom. Rymer v. Davis, 775 F.2d 756 (1985).
53. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
54. 754 F.2d at 200-01.
55. Id. at 200. The Hays ruling failed to state specifically that a municipality's fail-
ure to train implies a custom of authorizing or condoning police misconduct. Rather,
the Hays court discussed the necessity of a causal link between the municipality's inac-
tion and the officers' misconduct, which is "essentially the same concept" as the policy
or custom requirement. 668 F.2d at 872.
56. 754 F.2d at 201.
57. After Tuttle, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Rymer. City of
Shephardsville v. Rymer, 105 S. Ct. 3518 (1985). On remand, the Sixth Circuit reaf-
firmed its decision. Rymer v. Davis, 775 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1985). The court noted that
Tuttle did not control because Rymer presented the exact issue upon which the Supreme
Court in Tuttle did not express its opinion. Id. at 757.
58. 775 F.2d at 757. The court noted that its decision was not based on an inference
from a single incident but was based on "a finding by the jury that the City of Shephard-
sville inadequately trained its police officers." Id.
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
270 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:261
Monell.59
Second, Rymer followed the same theory of liability established in
Hays.6 ° The Rymer court recognized the existence of municipal liabil-
ity because the plaintiff demonstrated that the municipality was so
reckless or grossly negligent in training its officers that future police
misconduct was almost inevitable or substantially certain to result.61
The Rymer court's third criteria for determining municipal liability
was a causal link between the municipality's failure to train and the
police officer's misconduct.62 The court held that the city's failure to
train its police officers together with the broad authority given its of-
ficers for purposes of effecting arrests directly caused Rymer's inju-
ries.63 According to the court, the municipal practice of allowing
officers to use their own discretion in arrest procedures made the city
liable for any civil rights violations arising from that custom. 64
In Rymer the court attempted to resolve a question the Supreme
Court has never answered: whether inadequate training of a police
force satisfies the Monell policy or custom requirement.65 The court
found that the city's grant of carte blanche authority to its police of-
ficers regarding arrest procedures sufficiently demonstrated the pres-
ence of a municipal Custom. 66 Because Rymer involved an extreme
59. 754 F.2d at 200-01.
60. Id. at 200. The Rymer court recognized that the Hays court was questioned for
its failure to recognize negligence as a basis for municipal liability. See supra note 45
(discussion of cases allowing negligence as a basis for liability under § 1983). In Rymer
the district court instructed the jury on gross negligence. Thus, the Sixth Circuit did
not consider the issue of negligence as a basis of liability. 754 F.2d at 200.
61. 754 F.2d at 200.
62. Id. at 201.
63. Id. The court found that the City's custom of allowing its police officers to use
their own discretion in arrests, without the benefit of any regulations or training on
arrest procedures, was directly related to the abuse Rymer received during his arrest.
Id. Without this causal relationship, a municipality cannot be held liable for officer
misconduct. Id. at 201. See supra note 25. But see Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d
762 (5th Cir. 1984) (no causal link between city policy and delay of license and permit
for a building), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3476 (1985); Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F.
Supp. 455, 462 (N.D. Il1. 1982) (no causal link between failure to provide crowd control
training and single injury incident).
64. 754 F.2d at 201.
65. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
66. 754 F.2d at 201. The court pointed out that it had previously interpreted Mo-
nell to hold "that a municipal custom that authorizes or condones police misconduct
can be inferred when the municipality has failed to train or has been grossly negligent in
training its police force." Id. In Rymer the court found that the municipality had a
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example of failure to adequately train police officers in a vital area of
public work,6 7 the decision offers little guidance in determining specifi-
cally what other forms of inadequate training might constitute a policy
or custom.
68
Rymer discourages a municipality from according wide authority to
its police officers and encourages it to provide a competent, well-
trained police force for its citizens. A poorly trained police force
spawns lawsuits against the municipality, the cost of which the taxpay-
ers must eventually bear through higher taxes. Rymer focuses on the
necessity of a causal relationship between the failure to train and the
police officer's misconduct 69 rather than emphasizing the municipal-
ity's liability for its employees under the respondeat superior theory.7"
This approach avoids the potential problem of determining whether an
incident of misconduct arose from the officer's lack of training or from
his personal actions.71 Unfortunately, the court failed to formulate
specific guidelines for determining when this causal relationship exists
between the municipality's inaction and the officer's misconduct.72 De-
termining the presence of a causal relationship on a case by case basis
will result in inconsistent decisions among jurisdictions.
Rymer also failed to examine the question of whether negligence is a
proper basis for municipal liability.73 The court did, however, recog-
custom of giving its police officers unlimited authority to determine when and how to
arrest. Id.
67. Id. at 200. The municipality had no rules or regulations governing its police
force and did not require any pre-employment training. Id. The initial training that the
officers received was on-the-job training. Id. Furthermore, the police officers used their
own discretion in the arrest and treatment of criminal suspects. Id.
68. The court noted that the type or amount of training necessary to constitute a
"custom" was a jury question. 754 F.2d at 201 n. 1. The court recognized available
resources that municipalities could use as guides to supervise police officers. Id.
69. 754 F.2d at 201.
70. See supra note 19 (discussion of Monell Court's basis for rejecting the respondeat
superior theory).
71. One author proposes that the official who actually made the policy is liable for
any constitutional violations under § 1983. See Schnapper, supra note 33, at 223 (mu-
nicipality should be held to a strict standard in insuring proper departmental regula-
tions and minimal abuse).
72. Id. The court focused solely on the facts of the instant case and concluded that
a causal link existed. The court emphasized that the municipality's bestowal of carte
blanche authority to its officers "was directly related to the ultimate abuse Rymer re-
ceived during the arrest." Id.
73. Id. at 200. Because the district court instructed the jury on gross negligence, the
circuit court did not consider negligence as a basis for liability. Id.
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
272 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:261
nize concerns raised regarding other courts' failure to recognize negli-
gence as a basis for liability.7" Rymer leaves open the possibility that
mere negligence in police officer training may provide the basis for mu-
nicipal liability.75 If courts impose liability on the basis of negligence,
municipalities could be forced to insure that the training and supervi-
sion of their police officers is flawless. Citizens will certainly benefit
from the effect of such training and supervision.
Rymer is likely to have a positive and far-reaching impact on com-
munity safety. The decision places a great burden on municipalities to
insure that they properly train police officers. Under Rymer, munici-
palities are liable if a municipal practice of allowing officers to use their
own discretion in arrest procedures exists and these procedures violate
a citizen's civil rights.76 The likely result of this ruling is that munici-
palities, fearing liability, will no longer bestow unlimited authority on
their officers and will establish standard procedures in police training
and supervision. Courts will thus be able to determine with greater
accuracy whether liability lies with the municipality or with the indi-
vidual officer.
Caroline L. McKittrick
74. Id. at 200. Several courts questioned the Hays ruling, which failed to recognize
negligence as the basis for municipal liability. See supra note 45.
75. For an example of the court's implication that municipalities should be held
liable for the negligent training of their officers, see 754 F.2d at 200.
76. 754 F.2d at 200-01.
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